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Dignity and Second Amendment
Enforcement—Response to
William D. Araiza’s, Arming the Second
Amendment and Enforcing the
Fourteenth
Darrell A.H. Miller*
Abstract
William Araiza’s insightful article, Arming the Second
Amendment, has one essential, hidden component: dignity. Dignity
helps explain the peculiar hydraulics of Congress’s power to enforce
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment—a jurisprudence in
which the less scrutiny the Court itself applies to a given class or
right, the more scrutiny it applies to congressional efforts to protect
that same class or right. Dignity helps explain the Court’s halting
approach to Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power more
generally – an approach in which constitutional versus
unconstitutional legislation turns on seemingly insignificant
regulatory distinctions. And dignity’s role in § 5 enforcement helps
explain the efforts of gun rights advocates to portray themselves as
disempowered and despised members of a subordinate class. Araiza
has cogently broken down the complicated mechanics of the Court’s
equal protection, substantive rights, and § 5 enforcement power
jurisprudence, but it is notions of dignity that seems to drive this
particular constitutional engine.

* Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Thanks to Joseph
Blocher and Neil Siegel for discussing this project with me.
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I. Introduction
William Araiza’s wonderfully insightful article, Arming the
Second Amendment, has one essential, hidden component: dignity.
Dignity helps explain the peculiar hydraulics of Section 5
enforcement power—a jurisprudence in which the less scrutiny the
Court itself applies to a given class or right, the more scrutiny it
applies to congressional efforts to protect that same class or right.
Dignity helps explain the Court’s halting approach to
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power more generally, an
approach in which constitutional versus unconstitutional
legislation turns on seemingly insignificant regulatory
distinctions. And dignity helps explain the efforts of gun rights
advocates to portray themselves as disempowered and despised
members of a subordinate class. Araiza has cogently broken down
the complicated mechanics of the Court’s equal protection,
substantive rights, and Section 5 enforcement power
jurisprudence, but it is the flywheel—dignity—that seems to drive
this particular constitutional engine.
Part II of this essay recaps Professor Araiza’s useful analysis
of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and its
relationship to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power. For the most part, I think his analysis is correct, although
this is an area of many paradoxes; and, to his credit, Araiza doesn’t
try to resolve them all. Part III identifies the way dignity—
between courts and Congress, between Congress and the states,
and between rights claimants and the states—explains the
tensions within the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence.
Part IV offers some concluding thoughts on how humility—the
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cousin of dignity—may support the soft normative proposals
Professor Araiza supplies near the end of his piece.
II. Second Amendment Rights and the Hydraulics of § 5
Enforcement
A decade ago this year, in District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the
Supreme Court first held that the Second Amendment protects a
right to keep and bear arms unrelated to participation in an
organized militia. Since that time, lower courts have scrambled to
make the “Delphic”2 pronouncements in Heller work as practical
law. They have converged on what is generally described as the
“two part test:”3 a decision-making device that performs the
essential function of sorting issues between the constitutional and
non-constitutional
(the
“coverage”
question);
and
the
constitutionally compliant from the unconstitutional (the
“protection” question).
For example, using a gun to rob a bank is a non-constitutional
issue under the Second Amendment in the same way that uttering
the words “your money or your life” in the same circumstances is a
non-constitutional issue under the First Amendment.4 There is no
standard of scrutiny to be applied; no constitutional issue to decide
with these facts. The Constitution simply “does not show up” in
these cases.5 By contrast, a regulation that requires firearms to be
1.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. See Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas Ginsburg,
Brett Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, July 2012, at 24 (“The real problem is that Heller
is so Delphic, or muddled, that the kind of methodological debate found in
Heller II is unresolvable.”).
3. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
& Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged
as the prevailing approach.”).
4. See Glenn Harland Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment,
62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 478 (1995) (“Just as the demand ‘your money or your life’ is
not protected by the First Amendment, so the right to arms is not without limits.”)
5.
See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (quoting Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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kept out of the reach of children may well raise a Second
Amendment coverage issue, and yet may still be constitutional
because the government has supplied sufficient justification for the
regulation. Almost uniformly, the lower courts have employed
some version of means-end scrutiny to perform this protection
inquiry.6 Usually the scrutiny is intermediate, but occasionally it
is strict.
Although some judges have spurned the second portion of this
test as illegitimate7—and although some successful as-applied
challenges have blurred the lines separating the first and the
second steps8—the two part test still represents the predominant
mode of reasoning in the lower courts.
Professor Araiza’s bold move is to suggest that this two part
test is too crude a description of actual judicial practice.9 The test
actually is composed of five parts and applies almost
algorithmically. The refined test progresses as follows:
(1) determine if there is even a Second Amendment issue;
(2) evaluate how much of a burden the regulation places on the
Second Amendment; (3) determine how close to the “core” of the
Second Amendment the regulation touches; (4) choose a level of
scrutiny based on proximity to the core; (5) apply a level of scrutiny
(typically intermediate), with reference to the importance of the
government interest, the relationship between those interests, and
the regulation.10
I have a few quibbles with Professor Araiza’s explanation of
the doctrine, not so much with its descriptive accuracy as with its
analytical utility. First, I am not certain how distinct some of these
steps are from each other. For example, it is not at all clear how
much an inquiry into the “burden” on the right differs from an
6. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d at 194.
7. Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod,
J., dissenting), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th
Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
8. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017).
9. For additional empirical work on this topic, see Eric Ruben & Joseph
Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms after Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1452–53, 1507 (2018).
10. William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the
Fourteenth, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801, 1843–45 (2017).
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inquiry into the “core” versus “periphery” of the right. Courts
appear apt to merge these steps when they benchmark burdens or
cores at an unhelpful level of abstraction as, for example,
describing the right as “self-defense.”11 Further, as Justice Breyer
predicted in his Heller dissent, courts nearly always stipulate the
government’s interest in protecting citizens from gun violence as
compelling or important.12 Hence, the level of scrutiny typically
turns on matters of fit, rather than on evaluations of the
seriousness, or even genuineness of the government interest. I do
not think courts have agreed on what, if any, distinction there is to
be made between a “historical” versus a “longstanding” regulation.
Not only does this distinction raise further issues about the
relevant level of abstraction;13 the two formulations could be
discontinuous. Consider prohibitions on loaded guns in checked
luggage, which has been the law since the late 1960s. It is perfectly
possible that a court could find the regulation has no historical
parallel (no airplanes in 1791), but could still be longstanding (it
has been the law for nearly half a century). These are a few
examples of my doubts about the analytical utility of the five-factor
test. Although, again, I agree with Professor Araiza’s descriptive
point that all of these approaches appear in the lower courts to
various degrees.
The gravamen of Professor Araiza’s article, though, is not
about Second Amendment doctrine itself, but its relationship to
congressional enforcement power. His argument is that the
muddled nature of Second Amendment doctrine after Heller—with
its talk of cores and peripheries, its agnosticism concerning tiers of
scrutiny, and its imprecise measures of history and longevity—
complicates how a Court is supposed to evaluate Section 5
enforcement legislation after City of Boerne v. Flores.14
That enforcement jurisprudence is complex. Depending on the
rights or persons Congress aims to protect, the Court’s review of
11. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F.Supp.3d 124, 143 (D.D.C. 2016).
12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. For example, some bans on possession of firearms by felons and certain
misdemeanants are upheld because of a general historical prohibition on gun
ownership by the “unvirtuous.” Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second
Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1339, 1360 (2009).
14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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legislation can be either deferential or exacting. Professor Araiza
does an excellent job of pulling apart the different components of
the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence and he mounts a
heroic effort to systematize it. In general, the doctrine works
hydraulically: the less scrutiny the Court itself provides the
subject right or classification, the more it will scrutinize Congress’s
power to enforce those rights or classifications.
For instance, in Boerne the Court concluded that Congress
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers in
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).15 RFRA
required courts to apply a higher standard of scrutiny to free
exercise claims than the Court itself was willing to employ, and
Congress had not demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction such
widespread “religious bigotry” as to necessitate such a deviation
from the Court’s doctrine.16 Consequently, RFRA was not
sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to be a legal exercise of
Congress’s Section 5 power.17 By contrast, in Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs,18 the Court was less skeptical of
congressional evidence of sex discrimination in family medical
leave policy, presumably because the Court itself accords sex
discrimination a higher standard of scrutiny. Hence, the Family
and Medical Leave Act’s19 abrogation of state sovereign immunity
was a “congruent and proportional” exercise of Congress’s
Section 5 power. My description of the hydraulics of court
enforcement versus congressional enforcement of constitutional
rights is, of course, a simplification. Professor Araiza’s article
identifies the workings with much more nuance, and is not blind
to some of the paradoxes: sex discrimination garners
“intermediate” scrutiny from the Court, but in fact, that scrutiny
looks something more like strict scrutiny, or, perhaps

15. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
16. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530.
17. Id. at 533 (“The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a
lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate ends to be achieved.”).
18. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012).
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“intermediate scrutiny with bite.”20 Gender-neutral legislation to
prevent sex discrimination when taking leave from work is
constitutional when one takes leave to care for others but not when
one takes leave to care for oneself.21
Professor Araiza leaves other paradoxes unmentioned. Chief
among them is the relationship between the “congruence and
proportionality” test and Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. The employment provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act22 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act23
lack “congruence and proportionality” when Congress attempts to
break through the barrier of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. But when a person sues an individual officer for
prospective injunctive relief under the very same statutes,
“congruence and proportionality” never enters the picture.24
Similarly, it’s beyond dispute that subdivisions of states—counties,
municipalities, school districts, townships—do not enjoy sovereign
immunity.25 Which raises a huge unanswered question: City of
Boerne involved the city of Boerne, so why was the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power even relevant?26
Admittedly, these paradoxes are outside the scope of Professor
Araiza’s project. His primary observation is simple but important:
the less clearly the Court articulates a Second Amendment
standard using traditional doctrinal methods, the less clear is the
constitutionality of congressional efforts to enforce the Second
Amendment using Section 5. This ambiguity, which Professor
20. Brent L. Caslin, Gender Classifications and United States v. Virginia:
Muddying the Waters of Equal Protection, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1353, 1395 n.359
(1997).)
21. Araiza, supra note 10, at 1832–35.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012).
24. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9
(2001).
25. See id. at 369 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity
to units of local government. These entities are subject to private claims for
damages under the ADA without Congress’ ever having to rely on § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to render them so.” (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U.S. 529, 530 (1890))).
26. Cf. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(providing that municipalities are not automatically immune from liability under
the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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Araiza attempts to resolve, has practical consequences. If Congress
were to pursue legislation like concealed carry reciprocity—and
especially if it wanted to create a private right of action to enforce
such legislation—it would have to anticipate how the Court would
apply Boerne and its progeny, and, correspondingly, what kind of
record it would need to assemble in anticipation of such a
challenge.27
III. Dignity and the Enforcement Power
Professor Araiza’s contribution to this area is welcome and
illuminating. He has done a great service in describing the nuance
of the Second Amendment test, in disassembling the enforcement
clause jurisprudence, and in thinking through its application
through a developing right to keep and bear arms. But I wonder if
his analysis wouldn’t have been helped by attention to an
additional factor—dignity—which seems to drive so much of this
area of law.
Dignity, or rather, competing notions of dignity, seems to
explain many of the conflicting judgments in these cases. First,
there are competing dignitary interests between the Court and
Congress. Congress enacted RFRA under a Warren Court-era
assumption that Congress was a co-equal (or at least a junior)
partner in specifying and channeling constitutional norms. The
Court’s sharp rebuke of Congress in Boerne manifested its sense
that Congress had drifted out of its lane, and that expansion of
congressional enforcement power represented a diminution in its
own constitutional prestige to “say what the law is.”28
Then there are the competing dignitary interests between
Congress as constitutional enforcer and the sovereignty of the
states. The Court relied on notions of dignity in Shelby County v.
Holder,29 concluding that the Voting Rights Act’s formula for preclearance, which treated different states differently based on their
prior history of voting rights violations, violated the “equal
sovereignty” principle of the Constitution, which accords every
27.
28.
29.

See Araiza, supra note 10, at 1867–68.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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state “equal . . . power, dignity and authority.”30 Similarly, much of
the federalism jurisprudence of last thirty years—often
surrounding the Eleventh Amendment—rests on the notion that it
is an affront to the dignity of states as sovereigns for Congress to
subject them to private lawsuit without their consent.31 The
dignitary protections of sovereign immunity further curb
congressional aspirations already diminished by Boerne.32 Indeed,
it seems that dignity of the state is the only coherent justification
for these cases: given that sovereign immunity extends far beyond
the actual terms of the Eleventh Amendment,33 given that no
political subdivision of a state shares the state’s sovereign
immunity,34 and given that no individual officer of the state even if
indemnified by the state shares in the same immunity.35
Finally, there are the competing dignitary interests between
individual rights claimants and the states. Tennessee v. Lane’s 36
holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act validly
abrogates sovereign immunity is difficult understand without the
corollary that an alternative holding would have forced a disabled
individual to literally crawl up the steps of the courthouse to seek
justice. As Justice Ginsburg said in her concurrence, “[l]egislation
calling upon all government actors to respect the dignity of
30. Id. at 544 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). For more, see
Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175 (2013).
31. See Fed. Mar. Com’n v. S.C. State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 760
(2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (“Private suits against nonconsenting States,
however, present ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties,’ regardless of the forum.”
(quoting In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
32. For more work in this area, see generally Evan H. Caminker, Judicial
Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS OF AM. ACADEMY OF POL. SCI. 81 (2001)
and Julie Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
33. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
34. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
35. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1293–94 (2017) (“[I]ndemnification
provisions do not implicate one of the underlying rationales for state sovereign
immunity—a government’s ability to make its own decisions about the allocation
of scarce resources.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Caminker
makes a similar point. Caminker, supra note 32, at 84.
36.
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our
Constitution’s commitment to federalism, properly conceived.”37
Dignity appeared prominently in Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges.38 And, unsurprisingly, the concept
of dignity featured in the arguments and ultimate opinion about
the relative rights of cake bakers and homosexual couples the
recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case.39
As dignity does so much work, it is no surprise that gun rights
supporters appeal to notions of dignity frequently in their public
statements and briefs. Gun rights organizations have continually
portrayed gun owners as a despised and vulnerable minority, in
need of protection by the judiciary. Sometimes they argue that gun
violence prevention measures are not based on reasonable policy
metrics but motivated by anti-gun “bigotry.”40 (The premise here
seems to be if the regulation is over- or under-inclusive, then the
only reason for the regulation must be some type of animus.) Their
arguments appear in official briefing papers: lower courts are
engaging in “massive resistance” to gun rights, the Second
Amendment is being treated as “second-class.”41 The rhetoric—to
the extent it persuades some judges, Justices, and political
actors—perfectly advances the goals of gun rights advocates. They
are able to frame gun rights supporters as victims of a political
process failure, deserving of special protection by judicial actors,
37. A similar reasoning applies to the unanimous court’s decision in United
States v. Georgia, that Congress may use its section five power under the ADA in
an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case, given
the indignity that a state had left a paraplegic prisoner in a cramped cell to sit in
his own waste. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
38. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (explaining that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberties extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy”).
39. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No.
16-111, 2018 WL 2465172, at *3, 7 (U.S. June 4, 2018); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 28, 29, 100, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).
40. David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment,
81 TENN. L. REV. 417, 462 (2014).
41. See Darrell A.H. Miller, The Second Amendment and Second-Class
Rights,
HARVARD
LAW
REVIEW
BLOG
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-and-second-classrights/ (last visited May 12, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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and, should the judicial branch fail, they help cultivate a friendly
record for any prophylactic Section 5 measure Congress may
enact.42
IV. Humility and the Enforcement Power
But dignity is not the only value at play in Second and
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement going forward. There is also
humility: the recognition that human beings are fallible, that their
judgments sometimes have unintended consequences, and that
certain institutions may be better positioned to make decisions
than others. To this extent, my instincts are not that different from
Professor Araiza’s. Like Professor Araiza, I agree that legislatures
are in a better institutional position to weigh the costs and benefits
of most firearm policies. And, also like him, I agree that Congress
also has a better position to channel the moral and constitutional
sentiments of the nation.43 On this score, the humility courts
should employ is not the faux one so often rehearsed in judicial
confirmation hearings, but something more of the kind suggested
by Adrian Vermeule (at least where Congress has decided to act).44
This kind of humility would not lead to predictable results. The
same kind of deference to legislative judgments about the need to
restrict certain kinds of firearms would operate with respect to
legislative judgments about the need to protect Second
Amendment rights by allowing firearms to travel across state
lines. This is not to say that other constitutional considerations are
irrelevant.45 It is just to say that, as between believing and not
42. Furthermore, to the extent that Second Amendment rights are treated
as indistinguishable from self-defense rights, self-defense doctrine sometimes is
explained by reference to notions of dignity. See generally Margaret Raymond,
Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary Interest in the Law of SelfDefense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287 (2010).
43. See Araiza, supra note 10, at 1880 (remarking on Congress’s “capacity
for empirical investigation” and its “authority to speak for the values of the
American people”).
44. Adriane Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of
Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1507 (2007).
45. For example, it is undeniable that the more protective Congress or the
states become with respect to firearm ownership, the more the protective laws
will conflict with other, equally important constitutional values. See
Wollschlaeger v. Gov. of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (striking down
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believing Congress when it says that some kind of prophylactic
legislation is needed, courts should pay Congress the respect it is
due as an independent constitutional actor empowered by the
Reconstruction Amendments.46

portions of the Florida’s Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA)—the so-called
“Docks v. Glocks” law—on First Amendment grounds).
46. For more on this, see Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment
and the Regulation of Custom, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1852–53 (2011)
(discussing Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power).

